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B.  EFTA Court
Case E-1/02, EFTA Surveillance Authority v. Norway, judgment of 24 Janu-
ary 2003 (nyr)
1.  Introduction
On 24 January 2003, the EFTA Court in Luxembourg1 handed down its first
sex equality decision, on a case that happened to involve positive action in
favour of women in academia. In its ruling, the Court found the practice to
reserve a certain number of university posts exclusively for women to be in
breach of EEA law. Due to the homogeneity principle that underlies EEA
law, the EFTA Court’s ruling is based on EC case law on positive action. At
the same time, the judgment contains certain elements that indicate a wish
on the side of the EFTA Court for a different appraoch by the ECJ in the fu-
ture, based in particular on the changes brought about in EC sex equality law
through the Amsterdam Treaty revision. Given the fact that these changes are
not even part of EEA law, the case under discussion represents a particularly
interesting step in the dialogue between the EFTA Court and the ECJ on the
interpretation of EEA/EC law. The case is also interesting because it con-
cerns Norway, a country that appears to have been critical about ECJ case
law on positive action from the beginning. For instance, in her comments on
the famous ECJ ruling in the Kalanke2 case Gro Harlem Brundtland (then
Norwegian prime minister and generally considered as an EU-enthusiast)
seems to have implied that this judgment should not be followed in Norway.3
    1.   The EFTA Court handles actions brought in relation to the EFTA States that partici-
pate in the EEA Agreement (Iceland, Norway and the Liechtenstein but not Switzerland); see
e.g. Christiansen, “The EFTA Court”, 22 EL Rev. (1997), 539–553. More generally on the
EEA Agreement, see Norberg, “The Agreement on a European Economic Area”, 29 CML Rev.
(1992), 1171–1198, and Toledano Laredo, “The EEA Agreement: an overall view”, 29 CML
Rev. (1992), 1199–1213.
    2.   Case C-450/93, Eckhard Kalanke v. Freie und Hansestadt Bremen, [1995] ECR I-
3051.
    3.   See Sejersted, “Between Sovereignty and Above nationalism in the EEA Context – on
the Legal Dynamics of the EEA Agreement”, in Müller-Graff and Selvig (Eds.), The European
Economic Area – Norway’s Basic Status in the Legal Construction of Europe (Berlin: Arno
Spitz and Oslo: Tano Aschehoug, 1997), pp. 43–73, at 53. See also the references to Ms
Brundtland’s comments as reported in the Norwegian daily paper Aftenposten of 18 Oct. 1995,
morning edition (with thanks to Claus Isakson for helping me to find it).
246 Case law CML Rev. 2004
In the meantime, the relevant EC case law reflects an important development
that goes well beyond the narrow approach of Kalanke. The case now de-
cided by the EFTA Court therefore also raises the question how much room
is left (or should be left) for positive action.
2.  Facts and legal background
The action in the case under discussion was brought by the EFTA Surveil-
lance Authority (henceforth: ESA) against Norway in the framework of en-
forcement proceedings based on Article 31(2) of the Surveillance and Court
Agreement4 (SCA). ESA, which in many ways is the equivalent to the Com-
mission under EC law (and by whom it was supported in the present case),
sought a declaration that by maintaining in force a rule allowing for the res-
ervation of academic posts exclusively for women, Norway failed to fulfil its
obligations under EEA law.
According to ESA, Norway infringed Articles 7 and 70 EEA as well as a
number of specific sex equality law provisions. Article 7 EEA provides that
acts referred to or contained in the Annexes to the Agreement or in decisions
of the EEA Joint Committee are binding on the Contracting Parties. Article
70 EEA obliges the Contracting Parties to promote the principle of equal
treatment for men and women by implementing the provisions specified in
Annex XVIII to the Agreement.5 Point 18 of this Annex mentions the Second
Equal Treatment Directive in its original version.6 At the material time, the
revised version7 had not yet8 been made part of EEA law. According to ESA,
Norway infringed Articles 2(1), (2(4) and 3(1) of the Directive (in the origi-
nal version). Article 2(1) prohibits direct and indirect discrimination on
grounds of sex within the Directive’s field of application (essentially, em-
ployment matters other than pay and social security). Article 3(1) repeats this
    4.   Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Author-
ity and a Court of Justice, text available at www.eftacourt.lu/esacourtagreement.asp.
    5.   The only substantive sex equality provision that can be found in the EEA Agreement
itself is Art. 69 EEA, concerning equal pay for men and women. Its wording corresponds to the
former Art. 119 EC (pre-Amsterdam version).
    6.   Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for
men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and
working conditions, O.J. 1976, L 39/40.
    7.   Directive 2002/73/EC amending Council Directive 76/297/EEC on the implementa-
tion of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment,
vocational training and promotion, and working conditions, O.J. 2002, L 269/15.
    8.   In the Offical Journal, where the amending Directive is published, it is explicitly
noted that this is a text with EEA relevance. Making it part of that legal order is essentially a
matter of time.
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prohibition specifically with respect to access to jobs or posts, whatever the
sector of branch of activity and whatever the level of the occupational hierar-
chy. According to Article 2(4), the Directive “shall be without prejudice to
measures to promote equal opportunity for men and women, in particular by
removing existing inequalities which affect women’s opportunities”.
ESA’s complaint in the case under discussion related to one particular as-
pect of Norway’s sex equality policy. This policy included a variety of mea-
sures, among them target measures for new professorship posts, priority in
allocation of positions in fields with less than 10 percent female academics
and in fields with a high proportion of female students and graduates. These
elements were not considered unlawful and, accordingly, not challenged by
ESA (a fact that is emphasized by the EFTA Court in its decision, para 54).
ESA’s criticism related solely to national legislation concerning universities
and colleges that made it possible to advertise academic posts as open only
to members of the underrepresented sex. Based on this legislation, the Uni-
versity of Oslo earmarked a number of permanent positions and of post-doc-
toral research grants for women. In the year 1998, the latter included 20
grants allocated to the university by the Norwegian Government. These posts
were created specifically in order to improve the recruitment base for high-
level academic positions and they were explicitly targeted at fields were the
recruitment of women needed to be strengthened. During the years 1998 to
2001, the University of Oslo earmarked another 29 (out of a total of 179)
post-doctoral appointments and 4 (out of a total of 227) permanent academic
positions for women. ESA looked into the matter after having received a
complaint on this practice. It informed the Norwegian Government that ac-
cording to ECJ case law, measures promoting women could be regarded as
compatible with EEA law only if they did not automatically and uncondi-
tionally give priority to women, if men and women are equally qualified and
if the candidates are subject to an objective assessment that takes into ac-
count their specific personal situations. Since this was not so in the case at
hand, ESA considered that Norway infringed EEA law. The Norwegian Gov-
ernment did not agree with this assessment. Whilst admitting that by allow-
ing academic positions to be earmarked for women, the national law
provided for an automatic and unconditional preference for one sex, the
Government argued that there was nevertheless no breach of EEA law (the
arguments brought forward in that context are discussed in the following sec-
tion of this case note). Faced with the Norwegian Government’s opposition,
ESA brought the case to the EFTA Court.
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3.  The Court’s ruling
The Court’s final conclusion was that Norway had failed to fulfil its obliga-
tions under EEA law in the area of sex equality law (para 59). This finding is
due to the Court’s strict adherence to the homogeneity objective underlying
EEA, an objective that is recalled at the very beginning of the considerations
where the Court mentioned Article 6 EEA and Article 3(2) ESA/Court
Agreement according to which “the case law of the Court of Justice of the
European Communities is relevant for the EFTA Court when interpreting the
Directive” (para 36). Thereafter, the Court dealt with two distinct issues,
namely positive action (which made up the bulk of the judgment) and genu-
ine occupational requirements (which took up one paragraph only). In the
latter context, Norway argued that Article 2(2) of the Directive is applicable
in the case at hand, since the allocation of earmarked positions within the
University of Oslo is premised on a need for female members of faculty that
are able to meet the students’ legitimate needs. The Court simply observed
that there is no support either in the wording of the law nor in ECJ case law,
where Article 2(2) has primarily been applied in the context of public secu-
rity regarding policing and military activities (para 46).
In the relation to positive action, the Court began by pointing out the most
important elements of the ECJ case law from which it concluded (in para 43,
referring to Lommers9):
“As the case law outlined above shows, the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Communities has accepted as legitimate certain measures that pro-
mote substantive equality under Article 2(4) of the Directive. In
determining the scope of a derogation from an individual right, such as the
right to equal treatment of men and women laid down by the Directive,
regard must, however, be had to the principle of proportionality, which
requires that derogations remain within the limits of what is appropriate
and necessary in order to achieve the aim in view and that the principle of
equal treatment be reconciled as far as possible with the requirements of
the aim pursued ....”
In the following assessment of the specific case at hand, the Court refuted
both the factual and the legal arguments brought forward by Norway in de-
fence to ESA’s allegations. In this case note, the factual arguments will only
be mentioned, but not further discussed. First, Norway argued that there was
in fact no disadvantage of men because the research positions in question
were new posts constituting an extension of the total number of available
posts. The Court (para 52) found it unlikely that the earmarking scheme does
    9.   Case C-476/99, H. Lommers v. Minister van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij,
[2002] ECR I-2891.
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not influence the number of future vacancies open to men. It added that Nor-
way had not even alleged that the situation could be different in the specific
case at hand (which seems to indicate that the argument might have force if
better underpinned). The Court was even briefer regarding the argument that
the posts in question are of a temporary nature because they will lapse at the
latest when the professor retires. This the Court simply refused to accept
(para 53).
Norway’s legal arguments can be divided into three groups, the first of
which is based on a comparison of the specific measures at issue with those
mentioned in existing ECJ case law. The EFTA Court disagreed with the
view that the Norwegian case goes less far than Lommers which involved a
reservation of all rather than only of some places for women, as in the Nor-
wegian case. According to the Court, Lommers differed in that it was charac-
terized by a flexibility clause, an element that was missing in the Norwegian
case (para 47). The Court also denied that the contested measures are signifi-
cantly less disadvantageous to men than those at issue in Abrahamsson10 in
so far as men are not exposed to the adverse effect of a rejection on their
reputation as researchers. According to the EFTA Court, the case at hand ac-
tually goes further in that it does not provide for a selection procedure in-
volving an assessment of all candidates (para 51). The Court further refused
the argument that the present case is very similar to Badeck11 as far as train-
ing is concerned, by noting that the measure at issue in that earlier case did
not provide for a totally inflexible system (paras. 49 and 50). Finally, the
Court observed that Schnorbus concerned a special constellation which is
why the ECJ’s findings in that case are not applicable in the present circum-
stances (para 48).
A second group of legal arguments brought forward by Norway relates to
the conceptual level. First, Norway emphasized the importance of propor-
tionality, arguing that since the measures in question are temporary and form
part of a special programme favouring women in a last attempt to achieve a
more balanced representation of the sexes (all other measures had failed),
they have to be considered proportionate. According to Norway, even dis-
criminatory effects of such measures can be counterbalanced by an objective
fact, such as the under-representation of women, as long as the measures do
not exceed what it necessary. In particular, the extremely limited number of
all new temporary and permanent appointments is of importance when as-
sessing proportionality. In its decision, the EFTA Court only mentioned, but
    10.   Case C-407/98, Katarina Abrahamsson and Leif Anderson v. Elisabet Fogelqvist,
[2000] ECR I-5539.
    11.   Case C-158/97, Georg Badeck and Others v. Landesanwalt beim Staatsgerichtshof
des Landes Hessen, [2000] ECR I-1875.
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did not elaborate on, the issue of  proportionality. Instead, it emphasized the
following three elements in particular: first, the requirement that, as a matter
of principle, there must be a possibility that the best-qualified candidate ob-
tains the post (para 45), further and in the same context, the importance of
the criteria for assessing the qualifications of candidates (including the im-
portance of female life experience in that context; para 57) and, finally, the
requirement that positive action measures must provide for a certain degree
of flexibility in that they must not give absolute and unconditional priority to
female candidates (paras. 45 and 54).
Another conceptual argument brought forward by Norway was that posi-
tive action in favour of women should be seen as a positive aspect of equal-
ity. In that context, the Norwegian Government invited the EFTA Court to
adopt an alternative to the interpretation of the Directive developed by the
Court of Justice under which positive action measures are legally defined as
derogations from the prohibition of discrimination. Instead, such measures
should be interpreted as aimed at sex equality in practice or as an intrinsic
dimension of the prohibition of sex discrimination. The EFTA Court de-
clared itself unable to accept that invitation, due to the homogeneity objec-
tive underlying the EEA Agreement (para 45).
As a third conceptual argument, Norway maintained that Article 141(4)
EC and the amending provisions to the Directive should be applied by anal-
ogy. In that regard, the Court simply observed that these provisions have not
been part of EEA law and therefore cannot apply (para 55). The Court never-
theless remarked that the important changes in EC sex equality law through
the Amsterdam revision should have consequences for the interpretation of
law (para 56).
Finally, the Norwegian Government also referred to various provisions of
public international law relating to positive action, including in particular Ar-
ticle 4 of the United Nation’s Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). In that regard, the Court ob-
served that the contested measures cannot be justified under public interna-
tional law because the relevant provisions are permissive rather than
mandatory. As far as CEDAW is concerned, the Court pointed out that it was
already in force in the EU Member States when the ECJ rendered its positive
action judgments (para 58).
4.  Comments
In the following comment on the judgment, I will focus on five issues. I will
begin with some remarks on Norway’s argument relating to Article 2(2) of
the Directive (which, in my opinion, was not taken sufficiently seriously by
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the Court). In relation to positive action, I will first address temporary spe-
cial measures under CEDAW (which, I will argue, may be compulsory in
certain circumstances). In the context of EC law, I will recall some important
lessons from ECJ case law (which, I believe, now puts a particular emphasis
on the requirement of proportionality), then turn to the plea for a redefinition
of the concept of discrimination (often found in academic writing) and, fi-
nally, make some comments on the homogeneity principle and the dialogue
between the EFTA Court and the Court of Justice.
4.1.  Occupational requirements (Article 2(2) of the Directive)
To my knowledge, Article 2(2) of the Directive (in its original version)12 has
never been evoked before the Court of Justice as relevant in the context of
positive action measures. Norway’s argument that the earmarking of aca-
demic positions for women is premised on a need for female members of
faculty that are able to meet the students’ legitimate needs therefore appears
to be a new feature in the EC/EEA case law. It recalls the argument of diver-
sity, often heard in the U.S. American discourse on positive action at univer-
sities, in particular in relation to the admission of students. There, the
argument is that diversity of the student body is required in the interest of the
students. In the case under discussion, the same argument relates to the
teaching body but still in the context of the students’ interest. It should be
noted that, as such, the argument relates to the environment in which the pro-
fessors’ work is to be carried out rather than to the work itself. Given that
Article 2(2) of the Directive refers to occupational activities and training
“for which, by reason of their nature or the context in which they are carried
out, the sex of the worker constitutes a determining factor” (emphasis
added), it is submitted that the Court should have looked at this argument
more closely, rather than simply dismissing it with a few general remarks.
Obviously, the fact that the cases so far decided by the ECJ in this context
primarily related to public security regarding policing and military matters
does not mean that this is the only possible context in which the provision
can be important. In addition, I would argue that the ECJ’s decision in
Sirdar13 was in fact based on a wide rather than a narrow interpretation of
Article 2(2) of the Directive and that, again, this does not necessarily have to
apply only in the context of public security.
    12.   In the amended Directive (see supra note 7), this is now Art. 2(7).
    13.   Case C-273/97, Sirdar v. The Army Board, Secretary of  State for Defence, [1999]
ECR I-7403.
252 Case law CML Rev. 2004
4.2.  Temporary special measures under the CEDAW
As far as positive action under public international law is concerned, I would
like to raise an issue relating to the one Convention that specifically ad-
dresses discrimination against women, namely CEDAW.14 According to the
Court, that Convention is of no help in the present case for two reasons.
First, it was already in force when the ECJ handed down its positive action
decisions. This is essentially a homogeneity argument, based on the thought
that the ECJ never found an infringement of the CEDAW and this is, there-
fore, binding on the EFTA Court. In fact, the ECJ never even mentioned the
Convention in its positive action case law. Consequently, arguments relating
to CEDAW are a novelty at the level of the EEA and EC law. As such, they
presented the EFTA Court with the possibility to be the first of the two
Courts to rule on the matter. However, the substantive remark made by the
Court in that regard does not promise much good for such an assessment: ac-
cording to the Court, the positive action provisions in public international
law are clearly permissive rather than mandatory. It is submitted that this is
too simple an assessment, in particular as far as CEDAW is concerned. In
Article 4(1), that Convention contains a provision that specifically addresses
what it terms temporary special measures (TSM). It states that a TSM
“aimed at accelerating de facto equality between men and women shall not
be considered discrimination as defined in the present Convention”. The
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women is presently
preparing a General Recommendation relating to the meaning and the reach
of this provision. This Recommendation, once adopted, may well reflect an
approach that is different from that reflected in the EFTA Court’s consider-
ations. This is apparent from the building blocks for a General Recommen-
dation on Article 4(1) that were developed by an expert meeting held in
October 2002 at the University of Maastricht.15 In their conclusions, the ex-
perts emphasize the mandatory (rather than only permissive) role nature of
TSMs. They explain:16 “The mandatory nature of TSMs flows from the com-
bined reading of Articles 1/5 and 24 in which States are required to take all
appropriate and necessary measures to effectively put an end to all forms of
    14.   For the text of and explanations on the Convention, see www.un.org/womenwatch/
daw/cedaw.
    15.   The text of the meeting’s conclusion is printed in full in the Dutch Journal for women
and law, Nemesis, together with an introduction by the rapporteur, Rikki Holtmaat (2003)
Nemesis, katern, 35–42. The proceedings have since been published: Boerefijn, Coomans,
Goldschmidt, Holtmaat, Wolleswinkel (Eds.), Temporary Special Measures – Accelerating de
facto Equality of Women Under Article 4(1) UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (Intersentia, Antwerpen, 2003).
    16.   Holtmaat, idem, at 40.
EFTA Court 253
discrimination against women. The mandatory nature of TSMs is also ex-
pressed in the Articles (6–16) that require that States shall take all appropri-
ate measures. TSMs can provide the appropriate and necessary mechanisms
to accelerate the improvement of the de facto position of women. In so far as
they can bring about this result and this result cannot be achieved otherwise,
i.e. is necessary, they are also mandatory.” The experts agree that Article
4(1) by itself does not impose a positive duty on the States that are signato-
ries to the Convention. They argue that Article 4(1) is explanatory in nature
in that it states that TSMs do not constitute discrimination (hence my aver-
sion to the term “positive discrimination” which I consider a contradiction in
terms in the present context). By contrast, the legality of TSMs cannot be
judged on the basis of this provision alone which has to be seen in the
broader context of the Signatory States’ obligations under the Convention to
improve the position of women. In my opinion, this reasoning is both con-
vincing and appropriate. It is therefore unfortunate that it is not reflected in
the EFTA Court’s considerations.
4.3.  Important lessons from ECJ case law on positive action
Turning from public international law to EC law on positive action, I do not
find it necessary to discuss the EFTA Court’s interpretation of the existing
EC case law in detail as I believe that, on the whole, it is correct.17 In my
analysis, the decisive elements in order to assess whether a given measure
can be regarded as lawful positive action in favour of women are still those
indicated in the Badeck18 ruling (para 23), namely:
“[A] measure which is intended to give priority in promotion to women
in sectors of the public service where they are under-represented must be
regarded as compatible with Community law if
– it does not automatically and unconditionally give priority to women
when women and men are equally qualified,
– and the candidatures are the subject of an objective assessment which
takes account of the specific personal situations of all candidates”.
This test is indeed reflected in the EFTA Court’s remarks on the existing ECJ
case law on positive action. Nevertheless, three points merit special atten-
tion. The first relates to the guiding principles for the interpretation of Ar-
    17.   In particular, I agree that the Schnorbus case is not relevant for the present purposes
because of its very special constellation. It is in fact not clear whether the Court’s final finding
in this case is based on the concept of objective justification (relevant in the context of indirect
discrimination), on positive action under Art. 2(4) of the Second Equal Treatment Directive or
on a lack of comparability (which concerns an earlier level of the analysis).
    18.   See note 11 supra.
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ticle 2(4) of the Directive. In its most recent decision on positive action,
Lommers,19 the ECJ confirmed that it sees Article 2(4) as an exception to the
individual right to equal treatment, an approach that has been long criticized
both from within the Court (namely by a number of advocates general) and
in numerous academic comments on the Court’s case law. However, whilst in
Kalanke the conclusion drawn by the Court from this starting point had been
that Article 2(4) must be interpreted narrowly, it should be noted that this lat-
ter element is no longer present in Lommers. The Court now puts the empha-
sis on the principle of proportionality instead. As I have argued elsewhere,20
this is a different approach which is to be welcomed. Against this back-
ground, Norway’s insistence on the importance of the requirement of propor-
tionality was very appropriate. The EFTA Court, however, whilst mentioning
the ECJ’s statement in Lommers on the importance of the principle of pro-
portionality, does not observe that this is now the decisive test, rather than
narrow interpretation (para 43). In my opinion, this point would have de-
served more emphasis given that it is potentially far-reaching for judging the
legality of positive action measures under EC/EEA law. The second point
that is worth noting concerns the fact that the Norwegian measures involved
not only permanent academic positions but also post-doctoral appointments.
As these can be seen as training positions, the ECJ ruling in the case
Badeck21 is of particular interest. The EFTA Court observes in that regard
that “even for training positions, the law requires a system that is not totally
inflexible” (para 50). According to Arndt,22 the EFTA Court in saying so de-
parted from ECJ case law. The author concludes that the Court did not make
use of its full potential under the existing EC/EEA law when assessing the
Norwegian measure. I would submit that this is analysis is not correct. In
Badeck, the ECJ accepted a national measure that aimed to introduce strict
result quotas that were handled independent of the candidates’ qualification.
In so far, this is indeed the most far-reaching decision on acceptable positive
action that has come from the ECJ so far. However, it should be noted that
according to the ECJ even a strict result quota of the type at issue in Badeck
is not necessarily totally inflexible. The Court in this context noted that if
there were not enough applications from women it was possible under the
contested rules for more than half of the places to be taken by men, and that
further the rule applied only to training places for which the State did not
    19.   See note 9 supra.
    20.   Tobler, “Positive action under the revised second equal treatment directive”, in AFFJ
& EWLA (Ed.), L’Egalité entre femmes et homes et la vie professionnelle. Le point sur les
dévelopments actuels en Europe (Paris: Editions Dalloz 2003), pp. 59–92, at 72.
    21.   See note 11 supra.
    22.   Arndt, “Frauenquoten an der Universität Oslo und die Gleichbehandlungsrichtlinie”,
(2003) European Law Reporter, 138–144, at 142.
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have a monopoly (meaning that no male candidate was definitively excluded
from training). In other words, the ECJ did not find the Badeck measure to-
tally inflexible. It is true that the term “flexibility” may appear puzzling in
this context because it concerns a different kind of flexibility than that pro-
vided by the traditional saving clauses characterizing the measures in, for in-
stance, Marschall23 and Lommers.24 However, Badeck simply serves to show
that the Court, depending on the circumstances, may be willing to accept dif-
ferent types of flexibility. This appears also to be the interpretation by the
EFTA (see also para 41) which therefore should not be understood as a de-
parture by the EFTA Court from ECJ case law. It is my impression that the
potential in practice of such a broad understanding is yet to be discovered.
4.4  Redefining non-discrimination in EC/EEA law
Within the existing legal framework as described so far, the Court’s finding
of a breach of EEA sex equality law appears to be inevitable, in particular
because the Norwegian measure did not provide for an individual assessment
of the candidates and because it did not provide for any type of flexibility.
This is, of course, not to say that the existing legal framework is satisfactory
as such. After all, the grave under-representation of women in academia con-
tinues to exist, in the case of Norway even in spite of other positive action
measures some of which had been in force for twenty years. Prof. Jutta
Limbach, formerly the president of the German Constitutional Court, once
called the university “the most retarded of all provinces”.25 This might well
lead to a situation where CEDAW requires truly effective measure to be
taken. The fact that then such measures might run counter to EC/EEA law is,
of course, disturbing. In the case under discussion, the feeling that the exist-
ing regional law is unsatisfactory is reflected in the argument by the Nor-
wegian Government that the Court should adopt an alternative approach to
the interpretation of the Second Equal Treatment Directive, namely one
where positive action is not seen as a derogation from the principle of equal
treatment but rather as an intrinsic dimension of the very prohibition of dis-
crimination. In conceptual terms, this relates to the concept of substantive
    23.  Case C-409/95, Hellmut Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, [1997] ECR I-
6363.
    24.   See note 9 supra.
    25. Limbach, “Die zurückgebliebenste aller Provinzen ist die Universität. Der un-
aufhaltsame Aufstieg der Frauen in der Wissenschaft und die weibliche Dürre bei den Profes-
soren”, in Frankfurter Rundschau of 8 Nov. 1994, p. 11; also Limbach, “Juristinnen im
Wissenschaftsbetrieb – Feminisierung der Jurisprudenz?”, in Rust (Ed.), Juristinnen an den
Hochschulen – Frauenrecht in Lehre und Forschung (Baden-Baden: Nomos 1997), at pp. 15–
29, at 16.
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equality, according to which equality may require appropriate different rather
than same treatment, namely where two situations are not comparable. To my
knowledge it is for the first time that this argument is made in such a broad26
sense before the ECJ or the EFTA Court. Whilst it is possible to perceive ele-
ments reflecting a substantive equality in ECJ sex equality case law, these
concern specific and isolated issues only, rather than the general nature of
the equality approach under EC law in a very broad sense.27 In the case un-
der discussion and in the specific context of positive action, the EFTA Court
tries to make the best of these sparse elements by generally referring to sub-
stantive equality in the context of positive action (para 43). However, the
limits to that approach are immediately made clear by its reference to the ho-
mogeneity objective underlying the EEA Agreement which, according to the
Court, obliges it to adhere to the derogation construction mentioned earlier.
In that sense, both EC and EEA law are still far away from a truly substan-
tive equality approach. It is against that background that it is argued in aca-
demic writing that the Amsterdam Treaty revision brought about a change of
paradigm in the area of sex equality.28 Possibly, the EFTA Court is thinking
in the same direction when it points to these changes and states that,
“[I]nevitably, the interpretation of the Directive will reflect both the evolving
legal and societal context in which it operates” (para 56). This seems to be a
gentle hint to the ECJ to change its case law on positive action. It is all the
more interesting in view of the fact that none of the new provisions (which
include important changes in Arts. 2, 3 and 141 EC as well as the new Art.
13 EC)29 is part of EEA law. Nevertheless, at least Article 141(4) EC30 will
    26.  When certain advocates general (beginning with A.G. Tesauro in his Opinion on
Case C-421/92, Habermann-Beltermann, [1994] ECR I-1657) advocated substantive equality
in earlier cases, this always related to the “derogations” of Arts. 2(2) to (4) of the Directive
only, rather than to the meaning of equality as relevant in all areas of EC law (or at least of EC
social law).
    27.  Examples are provided by the Court’s explicit statements on substantive equality in
relation to maternity (Case C-136/95, Caisse nationale d’assurance vieillesse des travailleurs
salariés (CNAVTS) v. Evelyne Thibault, [1998] ECR I-2011) and concerning the criteria used
to evaluate qualifications of a candidate for a particular job (Badeck, supra note 12, and
Abrahamsson, supra note 11); on this latter issue see also infra under section 4.5, Homogeneity
and the dialogue of the two Courts.
    28.  E.g. Barnard and Hepple, “Substantive Equality”, (2000) Cambridge Law Journal,
562–585; Tobler, “Sex Equality Law under the Treaty of Amsterdam”, (2000) European Jour-
nal of Law Reform, 135–153; Koukoulis-Spiliotopoulos, From Formal to Substantive Gender
Equality. The Proposed Amendment of Directive 76/207. Comments and Suggestions (Athens/
Komotini: Ant. N. Sakkoulas Publishers and Brussels: Bruylant 2001).
    29.   See Tobler, op. cit. supra note 28.
    30.   Art. 141(4) EC states: “With a view to ensuring full equality in practice between men
and women in working life, the principle of equal treatment shall not prevent any Member
State from maintaining or adopting measures providing for specific advantages in order to
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eventually be relevant in that framework, albeit only in an indirect manner,
namely once Article 2(8) of the revised Directive31 is part of EEA law. In so
far, the EFTA Court in making its remark about the importance of the
changes in EC law appears to act pro futuro as far as the legal order which it
is called to interpret and apply in its judgments is concerned. This is a new
and particularly interesting constellation in the ongoing dialogue between the
EFTA Court and the Court of Justice.
4.5.  Homogeneity and the dialogue of the two Courts
As was noted earlier, the Court’s finding in the case under discussion can be
explained by the homogeneity principle: given the existing ECJ case law, the
outcome was inevitable. It should nevertheless be added that strictly speak-
ing Article 6 EEA and Article 3(1) SCA require that the provisions of the
EEA Agreement, in so far as they are identical in substance to corresponding
rules of the EC and ECSC law, “shall, in their implementation and applica-
tion, be interpreted in conformity with the relevant rulings of the Court of
the Justice of the European Communities given prior to the date of signature
of this Agreement” (emphasis added). In fact, all important ECJ case law on
positive action dates from after 2 May 1992.32 If the EFTA Court neverthe-
less relies on this case law, it is because it takes the additional obligation of
paying “due account” to ECJ case law dating from after 2 May 1992 (Article
3(1) SCA) very seriously. As Carl Baudenbacher,33 now president of the
EFTA Court, remarks in one of his articles on this issue, “homogeneity must
be aspired to irrespective of whether an ECJ ruling was given before or after
2 May 1992.” The same writer34 also observes that the homogeneity provi-
make it easier for the under-represented sex to pursue a vocational activity or to prevent or
compensate for disadvantages in professional careers.”
    31.  Art. 2(8) provides: “Member States may maintain or adopt measures within the
meaning of Article 141(4) of the Treaty with a view to ensuring full equality in practice be-
tween men and women.”
    32.   From the time before that date there are only two statements of a very general nature
with no actual cases relating to them. In Case 184/83, Ulrich Hofmann v. Barmer Ersatzkasse,
[1984] ECR 3047 (para 20), the Court explained that paras. 2 to 4 of Art. 2 “indicate, in various
respects, the limits of the principle of equal treatment laid down by the Directive”. In Case 312/
86, Commission v. France, [1988] ECR 6315 (para 15), the Court remarked that “[t]he excep-
tion provided for in Article 2(4) is specifically and exclusively designed to allow measures
which, although discriminatory in appearance, are in fact intended to eliminate or reduce actual
instances of inequality which may exist in the reality of social life”.
    33.   Baudenbacher, “The Contribution of the EFTA Court to the homogenuous develop-
ment of the law in the European Economic Area”, (1997) European Business Law Review,
239–247 and 254–258, 240.
    34.  Baudenbacher, “Ist die Rechtsprechung des EFTA-Gerichtshofs für Österreich rel-
evant?”, in Baudenbacher, Mayer and Torggler (Eds.), Ein Leben in Praxis und Wissenschaft.
258 Case law CML Rev. 2004
sions in the EEA Agreement are based on the assumption that a given legal
question is first decided by the ECJ whilst this is in reality not always the
case. In fact, in most cases the EFTA Court is faced with questions that have
not yet been addressed by the ECJ. As was already noted, in some respects
this is also true in the case under discussion. As for the EFTA Court’s re-
marks relating to the Amsterdam changes, it seems that the Court hopes to
influence the ECJ in its future interpretation of the relevant law. This is all
the more interesting in view of the fact that there is already case law decided
on the basis of Article 141(4) EC (if together with Art. 2(4) of the Directive;
Abrahamsson,35 Lommers36). Apparently, the fact that this case law does not
really differ from that decided only on the basis of the Directive in its origi-
nal version, does not seem satisfying in the eyes of the EFTA Court which
therefore would like to see a change. The ECJ is under no explicit legal obli-
gation to follow the EFTA Court’s case law but Baudenbacher argues that
such a duty nevertheless follows from the context of the EEA Agreement.37
It will therefore be interesting to see the ECJ’s approach in its future deci-
sions on positive action.
The same also applies in relation to another statement in the EFTA Court’s
decision which reflects a wish on the side of the EFTA Court to further de-
velop the existing ECJ case law. This concerns the emphasis put by the Court
on the importance of female life experience in relation to candidates’ qualifi-
cations. The Court rightly observes that under the present state of the law
(which requires an objective assessment of the candidates and preference of
the best), the criteria for assessing the qualifications of candidates are essen-
tial. The Court in that context points to the danger that in such an assessment
factors are considered that, on empirical experience, tend to place female
candidates at a disadvantage in comparison with male candidates (this was,
precisely, the concern behind the positive action measure that was at the ba-
sis of the Swedish case Abrahamsson). Against this background, the Court is
certainly right when stating that directing awareness to such factors could re-
Festschrift Walter Barfuss zum 65. Geburtstag (Wien, Manzsche Verlags- und Universitäts-
buchhandlung 2002), pp. 9–28, at 14, with further references.
    35.   See note 10 supra.
    36.   See note 9 supra.
    37.   The ECJ does occasionally refer to the case law of the EFTA Court. An interesting
example is provided by the case law on the precautionary principle according to which the
Member States – without having to wait until the reality and seriousness of those risks are fully
demonstrated – may take protective measures in relation to products if scientific uncertainty
persists as regards the existence or extent of real risks to human health. For examples, see Case
C-236/01, Monsanto Agricoltura Italia SpA and Others v. Presidenza del Consiglio dei
Ministri and Others, judgment of 9 Sept. 2003, nyr, para 106; also Case 192/01, Commission v.
Denmark, judgment of 23 Sept. 2003, nyr, paras. 49 and 50.
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duce actual instances of gender inequality. The Court adds (para 57): “Fur-
thermore, giving weight to the possibility that in numerous academic disci-
plines female life experience may be relevant to the determination of the
suitability and capability for, and performance in, higher academic positions,
could enhance the equality of men and women, which concern lies at the
core of the Directive.” This is a very important statement which, again, is
new in this general form. The Court of Justice had taken initial steps in this
direction in Badeck,38 in relation to the requirement under national law that
capabilities and experience which have been acquired by carrying out family
work are to be taken into account in so far as they are of importance for the
suitability, performance and capability of candidates. The ECJ noted that
these criteria, which in general favour women, “are manifestly intended to
lead to an equality which is substantive rather than formal, by reducing the
inequalities which may occur in practice in social life” (para 32). With its
statement about female life experience as a potentially important factor of
qualification, the EFTA Court goes a step further.39 From a practical per-
spective, the assessment of qualifications is particularly important because it
concerns a point in the analysis that is earlier than that of positive action.
Given the fact that under the existing law positive action can be an issue only
in the case of equal qualifications, given also Norway’s longstanding and
rather unsuccessful attempts in the context of positive action, the EFTA
Courts is quite right in drawing the attention to that earlier level. Indeed, if
(part of) the problem of underrepresentation could be solved on that level,
positive action would be much less of an issue. It is therefore to be hoped
that the ECJ will follow the direction indicated by the EFTA Court in that
regard.
5.  Concluding remarks
When the internet news service “EUobserver” reported the case under dis-
cussion, it gave a heading: “EFTA Court: No to positive discrimination”.40
The above comments show that, quite apart from the problematic terminol-
ogy used by the service, this is far too simple. First, the EFTA Court said
“no” to one very specific type of positive action only, namely the earmarking
of academic positions for women without an assessment of male candidates
and without any element of flexibility. All other measures practised by Nor-
    38.   See note 11 supra; this was later repeated in Abrahamsson (para 47).
    39.   It could even be argued that in doing so the Court in fact accepts a milder version of
the arguments brought forward in the context of Art. 2(2) of the Directive.
    40.   www.euobserver.com/index.phtml?aid=9139 (last accessed on 30 Sept. 2003).
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way were uncontested. Second, the outcome is explained by the homogeneity
principle which obliges the EFTA Court to respect existing ECJ case law.
However, the considerations show that the EFTA Court did its very best to
emphasize the positive aspects of that case law, in addition to pointing to a
better approach for the future (though the Court may yet have to discover the
potential of CEDAW in this context). Possibly, the Court’s good will in that
regard is also reflected in the fact that ESA v. Norway, the first EFTA case on
positive action and on sex equality more general, is also the first case where
a female judge sat on the bench – though Ms Dóra Guðmundsdóttir acted ad
hoc only. On the institutional level, both the EFTA Court and the ECJ are in
need of a more balanced approach.41
Christa Tobler*
    41.   This is essentially an issue of justice and of democratic representativity of the institu-
tion. As is well known, the presence of women on the bench does not automatically guarantee a
woman-friendly perspective on the side of the female judge.
     * University of Basel; University of Leiden.
